2021. Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In this book, I articulate and defend Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege’s insight that properties are not objects. According to this theory, properties are nothing but the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Fregean realism is the key to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley’s Regress and the Problem of Universals.
I also argue that Fregean realism can be extended to cover states of affairs and propositions. According to this extended theory, states of affairs and propositions are both just the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism thus leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world.
Although the production team at CUP successfully corrected most of the errors that were lurking in my original manuscript, a few managed to sneak their way into the final text. Here is a list of the errata that I have spotted. Please don't hesitate to tell me if you spot any more!
forthcoming. Truth without dependence. For a symposium at the 2022 Joint Session. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. draft
forthcoming. Against cumulative type theory. Co-authored with Tim Button. The Review of Symbolic Logic. archived | published (We have spotted a few minor typos in the published version. We will do our best to correct all the typos we spot in the archived version.)
2021. Truthmaking, grounding, and Fitch's paradox. Analysis vol.81 pp.270-274. archived | published
2021. Idealism and the identity theory of truth. Mind vol.130 pp.783-807. archived | published