Properties and Propositions I am currently working on a book manuscript, provisionally entitled Properties and Propositions. Much of the book is spent arguing that properties are not objects, meaning that they cannot be referred to by singular terms. I then use the conclusion that properties are not objects to dissolve a number of metaphysical puzzles. Finally, I extend my account of properties to cover facts and propositions too.
If you would like to know more about this project, then please feel free to contact me at: email@example.com.
Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth draft In a recent article, Hofweber presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premise from the philosophy of language: that 'that'-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I entirely agree with Hofweber that what we say about 'that'-clauses can have important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that far from leading us into idealism, denying that 'that'-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of direct realism about belief.